In a joint news conference held on April 22, 1998, the day before
Holocaust Rememberance Day, the representatives of Stephen Roth
Institute of Anti-Semitism at Tel Aviv University, the ADL and the World
Jewish Congress distributed a summary of their annual international survey
of anti-Semitism that deleted any reference to the Palestine Authority, the
Palestine Ministry of Information and the Palestine Broadcasting Corporation.
The stated reason: The full 400 page text is still at the printers.
That text does relate to the anti-Jewish tirades that have emanated
daily from the Palestine Authority since its inception in 1994.
A case in point: On the morning before this report was issued, children on
the official television station of the Palestine Broadcasting Corporation TV
program were led in a chorus that chanted Jihad and called for extermination
of the Jewish state. Quite a message from the PA: "Jihad" the day before
Holocaust Remembrance Day.
This PBC program is fully accessible to the media, and to the ADL, the World
Jewish Congress and Tel Aviv University.
Yet the media and these mainstream agencies have made a conscious
decision: to obfuscate the expressions of the Palestine Authority to their
own people from the people of Israel and from public opinion as a whole.
The PA media obfuscation policy is in keeping with the request made by the
late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the Israeli Broadcasting Authority in
1995 to refrain from any news reports that will feature what Arafat says to
his own people in Arabic.
In the words of IBA officials who knew of the policy, Rabin explained that
reportage of Arafat's speeches would hurt the peace process.
Rabin carried this policy to the US.
In September 1995, just before Oslo 2 was initialled at the White House, the
US House International Relations Committee conducted audiovisual hearings,
during which time more than thirty congresspeople viewed videos of the
programs featured on the Palestine Broadcasting Corporation. More than
fifteen news bureaus covered the event. Yet Rabin's cousin, Israeli
ambassador to the US Itamar Rabinovitch, working together with a high
official of the US state department, lobbied the American media and
requested that they not report these hearings. With the exception of the
Jewish Telegraphic Agency and the Washington Jewish Week, the media acceeded
to their request.
People in Israel are in the dark, knowing very little of the daily dose of
incitement that has spewed forth from the Palestine Broadcasting Corporation
since the inception of the Oslo process. Such matters are seen as the
obsession of a few anti-peacenicks.
That is due in part to a policy of self-censorship that the media has
imposed on itself and that groups such as the ADL and the World Jewish
Congress have adopted. The fact that the full report on anti-Semitism will
be issued in a few weeks time will have little effect on the public domain.
The ADL and the WJC will not conduct a press conference nor organize any
forum on the subject of official anti-Semitism that emanates from the PBC,
which is under Arafat's direct control.
On Holocaust Remembrance Day in 1998, let it be remembered that three
prominent institutions of the Jewish people have prevented the public from
knowing what they know, which is that the newly created Palestine Authority
makes no bones about its warlike and anti-Semitic intentions.
In 1996, the full text distributed to the press of the same
international survey did not even mention the Palestine Authority. In 1997,
the full text distributed to the media mentioned the PA in only a few
paragraphs that analyzed one PA poet.
Yet in 1998, when the full text finally dealt with the PA, the convenors of
the press conference decided not to distribute it and indeed, to delete any
mention or reference to the Palestine Authority in the summary made
available to the media.
Today there is legitimate concern about systematic Holocaust denial, when
organizations make it their business to prevent people from knowing about
the murder of six million Jews and what led up to it.
Deir-Yassin
by Prof Yehuda Lapidot
Hebrew University, Jerusalem
In March, the acts of hostility reached their peak, and it
seemed that the Ishuv (pre-state Jewish community) could no
longer endure the blows inflicted by the Arabs. The irregular
Palestinian forces controlled all the inter-urban routes, the
road to Jerusalem was blocked and the city was under siege. The
settlements of the Galilee and the Negev were also cut off.
Murderous onslaughts were launched on convoys, and the numbers
of Jewish victims grew from day to day. The despatch of armed
escorts with convoys had not proved effective, and most of the
armoured vehicles, which had been assembled with great
difficulties, had been destroyed or lost. The Arabs were taking
the initiative, and were aided to no small degree by the
'neutrality' of the British, who were doing nothing to maintain
law and order in Palestine.
Irregular forces streamed into the country from across the
border and reinforced the Palestinian units already active
there. Kaukji, who had arrived from Syria at the head of a large
force, operated in the north, and a large unit led by Hassan
Salameh, was active in the centre of the country. The Arab
forces in the Jerusalem region were commanded by Abdul Kadr
Husseini, who used Iraqi volunteers who had crossed from
Transjordan, as well as deserters from the British army.
The brunt of the suffering was borne by the Jews of Jerusalem.
The city was surrounded by Arabs, who harassed the inhabitants
of the widely dispersed Jewish neighbourhoods, greatly
restricting the area in which Jews could move around safely.It
should be recalled that although British troops were evacuated
from all the Jewish settlements in the country in February, the
British remained in Jerusalem until May 14, 1948. This presence
hampered the manoeuverability and defensive capabilities of
Jewish forces. The indifference of the British and their
reluctance to intervene made it easier for the Arabs to attack
the Jewish community.
The Jews of Jerusalem absorbed blow after blow: the death of
thirty five members of a convoy en route to bring help to the
Gush Etzion region (16/1/48); the explosions caused by booby
trapped cars down town; first in Hasolel Street near the
Palestine Post offices (11/2/48), then in Ben Yehuda Street
(22/2/48), wreaking death and destruction (50 dead and 100
wounded), and finally there was the explosion inside the office
building of the Jewish Agency (11/3/48) (12 dead and 44 wounded).
Moreover, the debacle at Nebi Daniel had a crushing effect on
morale in Jerusalem. At the end of March, the Jews of Jerusalem
had their first taste of siege. Contact with the coastal plain
was severed, and provisions began to dwindle. The atmosphere was
gloomy, and the leaders lost their nerve. The exhilaration
roused by the November 29 UN resolution, gave place to grave
concern and disillusionment as to the ability of the Jewish
defence forces to repel the enemy. By the end of March, some 850
Jews had been killed throughout the country1, most of them in
Jerusalem.
In view of the Jew's failure to beet off the Arab attacks, the
United State's government decided to withdraw its support of the
partition plan, and proposed to establish a special Trusteeship
regime sponsored by the United Nation.
By the end of March 1948 the fight for the way to Jerusalem
became a decisive battle for the city itself. Therefore it was
decided to concentrate a big countrywide effort to open the road
to Jerusalem, and on April 6 operation "Nachshon" began. This
operation included for the first time an initiated military
attack by a force of a Brigade.
At the self-same time the Irgun and Lehi in Jerusalem were busy
preparing the attack on Dier-Yassin, which was part of plan of
operation "Nachshon".
Deir-Yassin lies on a hill west of Jerusalem, eight hundred
meters above sea level, and 700 meters from the Jewish
neighbourhood of Givat Shaul. The Deir-Yassin fortified position
overlooked the westerly Jewish neighbourhoods: Givat Shaul, Bet
Hakerem, Yefe Nof, and the road to Bayit Vagan. The village also
overlooked the section of road linking Jerusalem to Tel-Aviv.
Deir-Yassin served as a halfway site for forces moving up from
the Arab villages of Ein Karem and Malha in the south to Kastel
and Kolonia, which overlooked the main Jerusalem - Tel Aviv
road.
Deir-Yassin was listed among the Arab villages to be occupied
during Operation Nachshon, which began on April 6. When the
fierce battle for the Kastel raged at the beginning of April,
Arab reinforcements passed through Deir-Yassin on their way to
the battlefield, and helped to drive out the Jewish force which
had occupied the Kastel.
When the Haganah command learned of the plan to occupy
Deir-Yassin, Shaltiel asked Raanan to co-ordinate the operation
with the scheduled renewed assault on the Kastel. Shaltiel even
despatched identical letters to Raanan (Irgun commander) and
Zetler (Lehi commander), in which he approved the operation in
advance. In it, he wrote:2
To: Raanan
From: Shaltiel
I have learned that you intend to carry out an operation against
Deir-Yassin. I would like to call your attention to the fact
that the occupation and holding of Dir Yassin is one of the
stages in our overall plan. I have no objection to your carrying
out the operation on condition that you are capable of holding
on to it. If you are incapable of doing so, I caution you
against blowing up the village, since this will lead to the
flight of the inhabitants and subsequent occupation of the ruins
and the abandoned homes by enemy forces. This will make things
difficult rather than contribute to the general campaign and
reoccupation of the site will entail heavy casualties for our
men.
An additional argument I would like to cite is that if enemy
forces are drawn to the place, this will disrupt the plan to
establish an aerodrome there.
When Shaltiel wrote the letter to Raanan, it had already been
known to the Haganah intelligence that armed forces, including
Iraqi volunteers and Palestinian guerrillas entered Deir-Yassin.
It was the Mukhtar of the village who met with the Haganah
liaison in order to inform him that he had no control over the
armed forces that entered the village, and that the promise that
Deir-Yassin would be a quiet village had no more power.
Akiva Azuly who served as Haganah second in command in the Givat
Shaul area testifies that the Mukhtar's brother did not support
the agreement and that shots were fired toward Givat Shaul from
time to time.3 On a bundle of news released by the Haganah
Intelligence Service on the goings-on in Deir-Yassin4 we find
that as early as January 28 a group of 25 people had been seen
training on the south-western slope of Deir-Yassin and among
them a man with the Arab Legion uniform. On 3.3.48 a group of 30
Arabs were seen training in the village. On 3.4.48 fire was
opened from Deir-Yassin towards the Jewish quarters of
Beit-Hakerem and Yeffe-Nof. In addition we find that the Arabs
built fortifications in the village and a big amount of
ammunition was being stored there. A few days before the attack
on Deir-Yassin there were reports about the presence of foreign
fighters in the village, among them Iraqi soldiers and
Palestinian guerrillas.
A research carried out by Arabs at the University of Bir Zeit5
tells that more over,
Arabs from Deir-Yassin took an active part in violent actions
against Jewish targets and that in the battle of the Castel many
of the villagers participated, helping Abd-el-Kadr el-Husseini.
It is also stated in the above research that ditches had been
dug in the various entrances to the village; and that more than
l00 men had been trained and equipped with rifles and 2 Bren
guns. There was also a local guard force, and every night, 40
villagers were busy taking turns guarding.
The armed forces, which had taken over the village, constituted
a grave threat not only to the small airfield, which was to be
constructed nearby, but also to the adjacent Jewish
neighbourhoods and to vehicles on the main road to the coastal
plain.
Going into Battle
On Thursday, April 8, about 80 Irgun fighters assembled at the
Etz Hayim base (the Lehi people met separately at Givat Shaul).
This was the first time that so large a number of underground
fighters had gathered openly, without fear of British policemen
or soldiers. The atmosphere was festive and our spirits were
high; at last we were going out to hit back at the enemy which
had inflicted such heavy blows on us for four months. The fact
that two underground movements were acting together increased
our sense of security and solidarity, and in honour of the
event, we chose the slogan 'Fighters Solidarity' (ahdut
lohemet).
Raanan, Commander of the Irgun in Jerusalem, opened the
meeting. He said that the aim was not only to free the western
suburbs of Jerusalem from the threat of Deir-Yassin but also
primarily to seize the initiative. The time had come to abandon
the defensive stance and take the offensive and move into enemy
territory. Occupation of the village would demonstrate to the
Arabs that the attacker could also be attacked. It would also
elevate the morale of the people of Jerusalem and restore their
self-confidence. Politically speaking, the operation would mark
a change in conception and would alter the direction of the war:
no longer retaliation operations, but occupation with the
intention of holding on to gains. Our own people and the entire
world would realise that the Jews were not ready to relinquish
Jerusalem, and if necessary, they would take it by force of
arms.
Raanan added and said that as the issue was conquest and not
retaliation, we should avoid, as much as possible, hurting any
Arabs unnecessarily. He warned time and again not to harm women,
children and the old. Even more so: any Arab that would
surrender, even a fighter, should be taken prisoner and he
should not be harmed in any way. Raanan said that in order to
avoid any unnecessary victims, it had been decided that the
attack would start with an armoured car equipped with
loudspeakers, which would enter the village before the sign to
open fire. The loudspeaker would tell the villagers that the
village was surrounded by Irgun and Lehi fighters and that they
are called to leave and go to Ein-Karem or surrender. The
announcement added that the way to Ein-Karem was open and safe.
Gal, Irgun operations' officer in Jerusalem, spoke after
Raanan. He explained that the objective was to occupy the
village, and hold the position. The plan was to attack in two
spearhead forces of two Irgun platoons would attack from the Bet
Hakerem direction, and a platoon of Lehi would attack from Givat
Shaul.
At 2 a.m., the Irgun fighters were driven from the Etz Hayim
base to Bet Hakerem. The force moved into the wadi, where the
platoons split up, each unit climbing up the terraced slope to
its assigned area of action.
The Lehi unit assembled at Givat Shaul and proceeded from there
towards the target. Some of the force advanced behind the
armoured car, which was proceeding along the path towards the
center of the village.
Close to 04:45, the village guards spotted suspicious movement.
One of them called out in Arabic: 'Mahmoud', and an Irgun
fighter, who misheard the cry, thought that some one had shouted
the password 'ahdut' (solidarity). He responded with the second
half of the password in Hebrew ('lohemet'). The Arabs opened
fire and as a result shots were fired from all over.
The armoured car advanced along the path and when it reached
the outskirts of the village, it encountered a trench along the
width of the path and was forced to come to a halt. The
loudspeaker was switched on and the message was read out at the
entrance to the village. Heavy fire was directed at the armoured
car from the adjacent houses and it was necessary to rescue the
fighters and wounded trapped inside
The other units launched an onslaught, accompanied by
explosions and gunfire. The Arab resistance was strong, and
every house became an armed fortress. Fierce fighting was
conducted from house to house. Many of the attackers were
injured in the first onslaught, including a number of commanders
who had been advancing ahead of their units, as was the custom.
The pace of the battle was slow, because the fighting was
conducted in a built-up area, and both sides suffered heavy
losses. In order to silence the source of fire, the Irgun
fighters were forced to use hand-grenades, and in some cases
even to blow up houses. Very soon, about 30% of the attackers
were out of action: most were wounded. And, to make things
worse, the ammunition ran out. Fortunately, there was a stock of
ammunition in one of the houses, so that the fighting could go
on.
A report on the course of the battle was transmitted by
courier to headquarters at Givat Shaul (neither the Irgun nor
the Lehi had wireless equipment then). When word was received of
the steadily growing number of casualties, and the shortage of
ammunition, several Lehi people went to the Schneller camp and
asked a Palmach unit to come to the aid of the attackers. After
receiving the approval of the brigade HQ, the Palmach troops set
out on an armoured car, equipped with a machinegun and a
two-inch mortar. On arrival at the village, they fired several
shells and machinegun rounds at the mukhtar's house. At that
very moment, without prior co-ordination with the Palmach, Avni
charged the mukhtar's house with several fighters. The attack
was successful, and the house was captured and cleaned up. Now
that the mukhtar's house had been occupied, firing ceased and
the occupation of the village was completed. Avni was so excited
at having silenced the gunfire that he did not notice that he
had been wounded and that his face was covered with blood. He
was bandaged and evacuated to the hospital immediately.
Only years later was permission given to publicise the report
written at the time by Eliezer, Haganah intelligence officer,
describing the role of the Haganah in the battle for
Deir-Yassin. It reads, in part, as follows:6
In the morning hours, it was decided to extend fire support.
This support took two forms:
a) Blocking the way to Arab reinforcements coming up from Malha
and Ein Karem.
b) A rear attack on Arabs dug in on the western slope of the
village.
The two actions were carried out from the Masrafa positions. In
order to enable the forces to attack from the rear, a Spandau
machinegun was brought. The Arabs were taken by surprise by the
gunfire and suffered considerable losses when forced to reveal
themselves to our positions.
When the fighting ended, it was discovered that hundreds of
villagers had retreated to Ein Karem, taking advantage of the
fact that the road was open. Those who remained in the village
surrendered and were taken prisoner. The prisoners, mostly women
and children, were loaded onto trucks and taken to East
Jerusalem, where they were handed over to their Arab brethren.
Because of the fear of a RAF (Royal Air Force) bombardment,
Raanan informed Shaltiel that the Irgun could no longer hold on
to the village. And, in fact, three days later, Irgun forces
withdrew from Deir-Yassin and were replaced by the Haganah.
Facts and Commentaries
So much has been written and said about what happened at
Deir-Yassin, that the battle, waged on the morning of April 9
became known as 'the Deir-Yassin affair'. It is important to
analyse the events and distinguish between facts and commentary.
The first question which should be clarified relates to the
number of Arab casualties in the battle.
On Saturday night, April 10th, the Irgun radio station 'Kol Zion
Halohemet', broadcasting from Tel Aviv, announced that,
according to a wireless report from the Irgun HQ in Jerusalem,
the attackers had suffered four dead (the number later rose to
five, whenYiftah died of his wounds) and 32 wounded. Two hundred
and forty Arabs had been killed, according to the report:7
The news item from Jerusalem concerning the number of dead Arab
was inaccurate. The Irgun commander in Jerusalem deliberately
exaggerated the number for psychological warfare tactics. In his
testimony, Raanan related that, when he radioed HQ in Tel Aviv
that 240 Arabs had been killed, he did not, in fact, know the
precise number. He had invented the figure although he was well
aware that the true figure was much lower. Exaggerated reports
of enemy casualties, Raanan argued, would arouse fear and
confusion among Palestine's Arabs and deter them from attacking
Jews8. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Arab
Committee, in its turn, believed that claims of a high number of
Arab dead, would rouse the Arab fighters to seek vengeance and
render them more militant. Hence, the Committee emulated the
Irgun, and announced that 254 Arabs had been killed. Only later
was it realised that this was a miscalculation, since the report
only aroused apprehension. Research conducted some time later,
based on Arab sources, revealed that the number of Arab dead did
not exceed one hundred9. An accurate body count of the Arab
victims was conducted after the battle by two physicians, Dr. Z.
Avigdori (who was Chairman of the Palestine Physicians
Association, Jerusalem Branch), and Dr. A. Druyan (his deputy).
These physicians came to the village and asked permission to
examine the corpses. They told the Irgun commander they had been
sent by the Jewish Agency to report on possible mutilations and
other atrocities committed by Irgun and Lehi fighters against
the Arabs. However, they said, if they were allowed to move
freely about the village without restriction, they would report
only what they had seen with their own eyes. This, in fact was
the case: they went from house to house without interference,
counted the corpses in the village and checked the cause of
death. The report, which is filed in the IDF Archives, attests
that there were no more than 46 corpses in the village. In
addition, it was reported that death had been caused by bullets
or bombs, and that "all the bodies were dressed in their own
clothes, limbs were whole and we saw no signs of mutilation."10
It turns out that the Haganah knew already two days after the
battle that the number of casualties did not exceed l00, as one
can learn from the following telegram which was sent from
Jerusalem11.
To: Beit Horon
From: Hashmonai
Appendix for concentration of news No. 151
[...] A reliable Arab source summing up Deir-Yassin, says there
are some l00 dead (killed) who have to be buried.
The enhanced prestige of the Irgun was anathema to the leaders
of the Yishuv. The occupation of the village as such, and the
Irgun report that such actions would continue, were
irreconcilable with the treaty with Abdullah and with Ben
Gurion's plans for the future of Jerusalem. It should also be
recalled that at that time, the Zionist Executive was discussing
the possibility of an accord with the Irgun, to which the Mapai
leaders were vehemently opposed. This was the background for the
smear campaign launched by the Jewish Agency in the wake of the
occupation of Deir-Yassin.
Three days after the battle, David Shaltiel published a leaflet,
packed with lies and slanders, in which he ignored the report of
the physicians and the report from the Haganah unit which had
taken part in the battle.
In this leaflet, Shaltiel chose to disregard the fact that he
had known of and even approved the action and had claimed, in a
letter to Raanan that the conquest of Deir-Yassin was part of
the Haganah's plan. On the other hand, he described the Irgun
and Lehi fighters as a band of robbers, whose only aim was
murder and looting.
The Irgun hastened to reply, and issued a leaflet, denying the
Haganah charges one by one. The leaflet states that:12
Deir-Yassin was captured after heavy fighting. Our fighters
were shot at from almost every house with rifles and
machineguns. The large number of our casualties, several dozen,
bears witness to this, as do the amount of arms which fell into
our hands and the number of Syrian and Iraqi dead, who were part
of the regular army force there .... Our troops conducted
themselves, as no other military force would have done: they
waived the element of surprise. Before the actual battle began,
they cautioned the villagers by loudspeaker and appealed to
women and children to leave at once and find shelter on the
slope of the hill .... We would like to express our deep regret at
the fact that there were women and children among the
casualties, but this is not the fault of our fighters. They did
their humanitarian duty and even more [...]
The Irgun even published Shaltiel's letter to Raanan, which
revealed that Shaltiel had known about the operation and
sanctioned it. Moreover, Shaltiel noted in his letter that the
capture of Deir-Yassin was part of the Haganah plan. The
publication of the letter caused great embarrassment to the
Haganah leadership and undermined Shaltiel's credibility.
The Jewish Agency went even further, when, in addition to the
leaflet war, it sent a cable of condolences to King Abdullah.
This cable was unprecedented and hence worthy of deeper
scrutiny. Even Kirkbride, the British Minister in Amman, noted,
in his cable to London, his surprise at the despatch of such a
message to Abdullah, since Jordan was part of the Arab League
which had declared war on Israel even before its establishment.
Legion soldiers, stationed in Palestine, had often taken part in
acts of hostility perpetrated by Arabs against Jews. Jordan had
even allowed Iraqi troops to pass through her territory to join
Arab forces fighting the Jews. And, even in Deir-Yassin, Iraqi
soldiers fought alongside the Palestinians. Hence, Jordan should
be regarded as an enemy or at least a potential foe. But perhaps
this was the reason which induced the Jewish Agency to send the
cable to Abdullah; to indicate to him that the Jewish Agency did
not consider him an enemy, and continued to honour the agreement
made with him in November 194713. Furthermore: although Abdullah
was monarch of Transjordan, for the Jewish Agency he was also
the uncrowned leader of Palestine's Arabs and thus the address
for any apology concerning the 'barbaric acts' committed against
the Arabs of Deir-Yassin who were not Jordanian subjects. The
Jewish Agency wanted to indicate to King Abdullah that it
dissociated itself not only from the acts of the 'dissidents' at
Deir-Yassin, but also, or mainly, from their declaration
concerning the liberation of Jerusalem and the entire country,
which ran counter to Jewish Agency policy.
King Abdullah did not accept these explanations and rejected the
apology. In his reply, Abdullah noted that it was generally
accepted that the Jewish Agency was responsible for all Zionist
activities everywhere and that no Jew would act in such a way as
to flout its policies. Abdullah concluded his cable by leaving
open the option for dialogue, and wrote that "the Jewish Agency
will do all that is necessary with regard to such
atrocities...". He added that the Irgun and others " must take
careful note of the possible consequences of their savage acts
and their inevitable outcome, if they continue in this
manner."14
Deir-Yassin became synonymous with Jewish atrocities against
Arabs, and the event is often referred to as 'the Deir-Yassin
massacre'.
The Arab village of Deir-Yassin was located in a spot of great
strategic importance, and in the course of the war which was
imposed on us by the Arabs, we had no choice but to capture it.
Was there in fact a massacre at Deir-Yassin and were Arab
corpses mutilated?
Massacre means the killing of defenceless human beings. The
unprovoked Arab attack on the peaceful Jews of Hebron one night
in 1929 and their indiscriminate killing was a massacre. When,
in February 1948, Arab workers at the Haifa Refineries attacked
their Jewish co-workers on their way to work, and murdered more
than 40 Jews in cold blood - that was a massacre. In both cases,
the massacre had been planned and the acts of murder were
premeditated. The loathsome murder of Kfar Etzion settlers by
Arab Legion troops, after the defenders had surrendered and were
unarmed was another such example.
And what happened at Deir-Yassin?
First, one should recall the strict orders given to the fighters
before the battle, not to harm women, children and old people.
It was also stated explicitly that any Arabs who surrendered,
even fighters, should be taken captive and treated in accordance
with the Geneva Convention.
Secondly, an unprecedented thing was done at Deir Yassin: a
loudspeaker was installed on an armoured car, and the attackers
informed the villagers that the road to Ein Karem was open and
secure and that those who left would not be harmed. By using a
loudspeaker, the attackers forfeited the surprise element.
However, the commander of the Irgun in Jerusalem believed that
every effort should be made to avoid Arab civilian casualties
even if that was the cost. The Arabs have never denied that a
loudspeaker was used, and an Arab League publication on 'Israeli
aggression' notes, inter alia: "On the night of April 9, 1948,
the quiet Arab village of Deir-Yassin was taken by surprise when
a loudspeaker called the inhabitants to evacuate the village
immediately"15.
Thirdly, it is universally conceded that a fierce battle raged
at Deir-Yassin. In the research carried out at the Bir Zeit
University, as mentioned, it was stated that there were more
than 100 Arab fighters in the village equipped with rifles and 2
Bren-guns with plenty of ammunition. The Arabs were holed up in
the stone buildings of the village while the attackers were
exposed to enemy fire. The fierce gunfire directed from the
houses forced the attackers to use grenades and in several cases
even to blow up houses in order to advance. Thus, it happened
that there were women and children among the victims. a
It seems appropriate at this point to quote Ben Gurion's remarks
at the Mapai Central Committee in January 1948:
This is a war and there is no possibility, I want to stress this
with the greatest clarity, of distinguishing between people. In
war, one cannot avoid harming the innocent16.
The number of dead is of great importance to the question of
whether it was a battle or a slaughter. According to all extant
documents and testimony, it is now clear that the number of
Arabs killed at Deir-Yassin was less than one hundred, and not
240, as published. Moreover, the battle was the first in the War
of Independence to be waged in a built-up area, and this is
accepted as one of the most difficult forms of warfare, and the
costliest in human terms. This is the reason why 35% of the
attacking Irgun and Lehi force were injured or killed by enemy
fire. Incidentally, the second battle of this kind conducted in
the War of Independence was the Palmach attack on Qatamon, some
two weeks after the capture of Deir-Yassin. In that battle,
which was waged from house to house, some 40% of the force were
injured or killed, while among the Arabs, 80 were killed and
some 150 injured.
All the Arab victims at Deir-Yassin were killed in battle, and
the moment the battle ended all killing ceased. Those villagers;
men, women and children who surrendered, were taken prisoner,
and no harm came to them. When the fighting was over, they were
conveyed by car to East Jerusalem and handed over to their Arab
brethren.
As regards the accusations of mutilation and rape, it is enough
to quote the report of the physicians sent by the Jewish Agency
to examine the situation: "all the bodies were dressed in their
own clothes, limbs were whole and we saw no signs of
mutilation."
In light of the facts of the battle for Deir-Yassin, one cannot
escape the conclusion that, in condemning the Irgun and Lehi,
the Jewish Agency leaders were guided by purely political
motives and not by their consciences.
They were motivated by internal and external political
considerations. The former were connected to the growing
sympathy for the Irgun in the country at large and Jerusalem in
particular. An increasing proportion of the Yishuv now
recognised the justice of the Irgun cause and believed that the
end of the British mandate was the outcome of the stubborn
underground struggle against the foreign rulers.
The unique situation in Jerusalem had intensified support for
the Irgun in the city. The people of Jerusalem felt like
stepchildren, since the city was not included within the borders
of the Jewish State. The Arab onslaughts, growing more frequent,
the large number of casualties (higher than anywhere else in the
country) the detachment from the coastal plain and the
increasing shortage of food and water, all these had evoked
disillusionment with the Haganah and the Zionist Executive. The
growing support for the underground movement greatly concerned
the establishment leaders who had remained in Jerusalem, and
they emphasised this in their reports to Ben Gurion.
Support for the Irgun gained momentum after the capture of
Deir-Yassin. The feeling was that at last someone had proved
capable of giving the right answer to the murderous Arab
attacks.
As noted, the Zionist Executive was holding feverish discussions
at the time on the possibility of an accord with the Irgun. The
Mapai leaders, who were emphatically opposed to the idea, hoped
that their shameful smear campaign against the Irgun would
forestall this move. And, in fact, one of the arguments cited
against ratifying the accord was: "See what the Irgun is
capable of. We cannot enter into an agreement with such people."
The champions of the accord, on the other hand, argued that the
Deir-Yassin incident demonstrated what could happen when the
Irgun operated alone, without an agreement17. Ben Gurion feared
that the rise in the Irgun's strength in Jerusalem was liable to
disrupt his political plans for the future of the city. He hoped
that the charges against the Irgun and Lehi would reduce public
sympathy for them.
The external political reason was related to the treaty with
King Abdullah. The Jews had agreed to the Arab Legion's
occupation of Judea and Samaria, which would then be
incorporated in the Kingdom of Jordan, and in return, the Legion
was to refrain from attacking the Jewish State.
Ben Gurion feared that the capture of Deir-Yassin would be
interpreted by Abdullah as a Jewish volte-face. A particularly
profound impression had been made in Britain, and subsequently
also in Jordan, by the statement of the Irgun commander at the
press conference convened at Givat Shaul after the battle:
[...] We intend to attack, to occupy and to hold fast until all
of Eretz Israel [Palestine] is in our hands. The attack on
Deir-Yassin is the first stage ....18
In its smear campaign against the Irgun and Lehi, the Zionist
leadership tried to create the impression that these were
marginal groups without influence, and that their actions and
declarations should not be taken into account. The leadership
wanted to isolate the two underground movements, both within
theYishuv and vis a vis the outside world. It failed to do this,
however: the Jewish community in Jerusalem displayed even
greater sympathy with the Irgun, and foreign diplomats now
perceived the Irgun as a factor to be reckoned with in
discussing the future of Jerusalem.
The Deir-Yassin affair had a strong impact on the course of the
War of Independence, and was summed up as follows in the
"History of the War of Independence" produced by the History
Division of the IDF:
The Deir-Yassin affair, known throughout the world as the
'Deir-Yassin massacre', damaged the reputation of theYishuv at
the time. All the Arab propaganda channels disseminated the
story at the time and continue to do so to this day. But it
indubitably also served as a contributory factor to the collapse
of the Arab hinterland in the period, which followed. More then
the act itself, it was the publicity it received from Arab
spokesmen which achieved this aim. Their intention was to
convince their people of the savagery of the Jews and to rouse
their militant religious instincts. But, in actual fact, they
succeeded only in intimidating them. Today they admit the error
themselves.
Notes:
1 out of a Jewish community numbering 600,000
2 Yoshua Ofir, On The Walls, p. 63
3 Akiva Azuly a Man of Jerusalem, p. 70
4 IDF Archives, 2504/49/16
5 Knaana Sharif, The Palestinian Villages Destroyed in 1948 - Deir-Yassin,
Bir-Zeit University, 1987
6 David Shaltiel, Jerusalem 1948, p. 141
7 Menachem Begin, In The Underground D, p. 247
8 Interview with Mordechai Raanan
9 Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948, p. 148
10 IDF Archives, 500/48-54
11 Central Zionist Archives, M 16/19
12 Menachem Begin, In The Underground D, p. 276
13 In November 1947 a meeting was held in Naharayim
between Golda Meyersson (Meyir) and King Abdullah. In this
meeting it was agreed between the two that after the British
left Palestine, the Arab Legion would invade the western part of
Palestine and would take Judea and Sammaria (the West Bank), an
area allocated for the Palestinian State. In compensation, the
King promised not to attack the Jewish State that would be
established.
14 Central Zionist Archives, S 25/1704. English Translation S 25/4150
15 Deir-Yassin, Publication by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, March 1969
16 Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, p. 680.
17 Haaretz newspaper, 12/4/1948
18 Public Records, London, CO 733 477/514
Return to Contents
In early February, Gen. Tawfik Tirawi, the head of the
muhabarat, the Palestinian secret police, arranged for the head
of the CIA station in Tel Aviv to accompany him to the Jericho
jail, where Youssef and Shaher Ra'i are confined.
The Ra'i cousins, from Qalqilyah, serving seven-year sentences,
have been linked to the killings of Ohad Bachrach and Uri Shahor
-- Israeli hikers stabbed to death in Wadi Qelt, between
Jerusalem and Jericho, in 1995. Bachrach's and Shahor's
relatives, who accompanied Benjamin Netanyahu on his January
visit to Washington, had claimed that the Ra'is were free to
wander at will in the Jericho area -- a claim endorsed by
Netanyahu aides; Gen. Tirawi proclaimed that the Jericho jail
visit showed up "the lie of Netanyahu."
The CIA visitor was shown a four-man cell, with Shaher Ra'i
sitting in it. He had a TV, a radio and a refrigerator; on the
walls were photographs of his two daughters and of his heroes --
Cuban revolutionary leader Ernesto (Che) Guevara, and master
Hamas bombmaker Yihya Ayyash, "the Engineer," who was killed by
Israel in 1996. Jericho jail commander Walid Jabali insisted the
Ra'is had not left the jail since September 1995, when they were
arrested and jailed -- in a 10-minute trial -- for damaging
Palestinian national interests, rather than as accomplices to
murder.
But, the Report has learned, the visit was an elaborate ruse to
placate the Americans. The Ra'is are prisoners only in name;
until recently the two activists of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine had been leading normal lives outside
the prison walls, albeit inside Jericho city limits. Eye
witnesses have seen them at coffeeshops and markets in the town,
in the company of family members and friends.
The Ra'is, on a list of 36 alleged terrorists whose extradition
is demanded by Israel, represent the rule, not the exception. A
few of those on the Israeli list are indeed in prison, but
others have long since been freed -- and many more have never
been arrested. Israel often complains about what it calls the
PA's "revolving-door policy" of quickly freeing those involved
in terrorism. Ironically, having kicked up an international
furor over the Ra'is, Israeli government sources now privately
admit that they are no longer absolutely certain the cousins
were actually involved in the Wadi Qelt murders at all. On the
basis of The Report's investigation, however, many other of the
Israeli complaints are well founded.
On the orders of Yasser Arafat, Palestinians arrested for
attacking Israelis are tried almost instantly by special State
Security Courts, and convicted and sentenced before Israel can
begin extradition proceedings. The courts often mete out
sentences that seem severe -- but defendants rarely serve more
than a few months behind bars before they are reunited with
their families, and allowed to move freely in PA-controlled
territory. If they renounce membership in Hamas or one of the
other radical organizations, and pledge their allegiance to
Arafat's mainstream Fatah organization, they often find
employment with one of the 10 official PA security agencies
operating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The Palestinian Authority refuses to provide statistics on
terror-linked convicts released before the end of their terms.
But Palestinian sources say that between their foundation in
April 1995 and the end of 1997, the courts tried and sentenced
46 Palestinians for direct and indirect involve ment in
anti-Israel terror. Sentences ranged from six months in jail to
life; many of those jailed, particularly those sentenced to two
years or less, were freed in months.
They are the beneficiaries of a Palestinian strategy --
repeatedly underlined by officials -- that no Palestinian will
ever extradite his brother, under any circumstances, to the
Israeli enemy. "If some day Jewish terrorists responsible for
killing Arabs are handed over to us, we might consider making a
reciprocal gesture," says Sufyan Abu Zaideh, the head of the
Palestinian Authority's "Israeli Desk." "In the meantime, Israel
has no right to ask for the extradition of Palestinians who have
already been sentenced by our courts."
The Israeli extradition list includes at least 10 people who are
now members of the various Palestinian security forces -- and is
topped by Ghazi Jabali, the Palestinian police commissioner for
Gaza and the West Bank, who heads the 12,000-strong,
blue-uniformed police force. Israel suspects that Jabali has
organized terror cells inside the force itself, and instructed
individual policemen to carry out attacks against Israelis.
Jabali calls the charges "ridiculous," and warns that any
attempt to arrest him will lead to armed confrontation.
Others on the Israeli list, now serving in Palestinian law
enforcement, include:
The ranks of the various Palestinian security forces also
include a large number of Palestinians guilty of crimes against
other Palestinians, particularly those who collaborated with
Israel during the Intifada. Israel released them as part of the
1993 Oslo Accords -- on condition they be confined to Jericho.
But many of them have been given weapons, military or police
ranks, and security posts in the West Bank and Gaza.
Take the case of Nasser Abu Hmeid, of the Al-Amari refugee camp
near Ramallah, sentenced by Israel in 1993 to nine life terms
for his role in the decapitation killings of collaborators.
Shortly after his post-Oslo transfer to Jericho, Abu Hmeid --
who headed a group called the Masked Lion -- joined the
Palestinian Preventive Security apparatus as an interrogator. In
1994, a few weeks before control of West Bank cities was handed
over to the PA, Abu Hmeid was caught by an undercover Israeli
patrol in Ramallah. He is now back in an Israeli prison --
because he violated the terms of his release by leaving Jericho.
Not all freed prisoners join the ranks of the Palestinian
police. Some have gone on to carry out other terror acts. The
best-known case is that of Moawiya Jarara, Bashar Salawah and
Tawfiq Yassin, who blew themselves up in the September 1997
Ben-Yehudah mall attack. All three had been detained by Arafat's
police in Nablus in March 1996, but unexplainably strolled free
six months later.
Palestinian officials admit that some of those accused of
security offenses have been freed, but say they don't understand
why Israel is so agitated. "So what if Israel says these people
are involved in attacks," says a Palestinian general based in
Ramallah. "That doesn't automatically make it true. Besides,
some of the accusations go back to before the Oslo Accords. If
we punish everyone guilty of acts of violence between 1967 and
Oslo, in 1993, we will have to arrest tens of thousands of
Palestinians.
"The next thing the Netanyahu government will do," he continues,
"is ask for the extradition of Abu Amar, Yasser Arafat. If that
happens, we'll have the right to ask for the extradition of
Yitzhak Shamir and other Israeli leaders who are responsible for
atrocities against our people."