• The Abu Mazen File and the Akiva Eldar File (When a Leading Journalist is Hired by a Foreign Government-Funded Political Organization) by David Bedein
• Background: Will Egypt Expedite Arming Terrorists Via Terror Highway? by Dr Aaron Lerner
• World Jewish Congress Exposes UNRWA Refugee Camps as Bases for Terror
• Dennis Ross Declares Tanzim to be Peaceful And Trusts Abu Mazen Like He Trusted Arafat
• Refused Israeli Citizenship Because He Went Through Orthodox Jewish Conversion

The Abu Mazen File and the Akiva Eldar File
(When a Leading Journalist is Hired by a Foreign Government-Funded Political Organization)
David Bedein

The Abu Mazen File

During the current negotiations, the US, the EU, the Canadian government and even the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs have stressed their perennial optimism concerning the appointment of Abu Mazen as the new Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, even though all spokesman of the PA stress that Abu Mazen reports directly to Yassir Arafat.

Yet documents seized from the PA headquarters in the Ramallah "Mukata" in April 2002 sheds startling light on the role of Abu Mazen in the terror campaign that the PLO has been operating since September 2000.

These documents, now in the hands of a major television documentary producer who is preparing a TV documentary which will air in the Fall, show that Abu Mazen played a major and direct role in the planning and execution of the current PLO campaign that has resulted in more than 17,000 Arab terror attacks in less than three years and more than 800 Israelis murdered in cold blood.

The source of the damning Abu Mazen documents: Israeli intelligence.

The CIA and the M5, the respective intelligence services of the US and Great Britain, have verified the authenticity of these documents.

The question remains whether the Israeli Prime Minister has received the Abu Mazen file. The next question remains whether Israeli intelligence has shared this with foreign intelligence services and with the democratically elected leaders who are now dealing with the Palestinian Authority, especially the US.

We have asked these questions of Israeli, US, EU and Canadian spokespeople, and have not gotten any response.

The Akiva Eldar File:
When an Israeli Journalist is Hired by a Political Organization
Which is Funded by the E.U.

The Foundation For Middle East Peace organization is headed by former US intelligence officials Phillip Wilcox and Geoffrey Aronson, and funded through the European Union. The purpose of the foundation is to sway the media, the US government and all foreign governments against Israel's settlement policies.

In early June, the Foundation dispatched an invitation to the media to cover a June 16th lecture provided by the veteran Israeli journalist Akiva Eldar. The lecture, co-sponsored by the Americans for Peace Now and the Carnegie Foundation, took place at the National Press Club in Washington, DC. The Foundation for Middle East Peace announced in their invitation that their lobby had commissioned Eldar to write a book about Israel's settlement policies.

From a transcript received from the foundation, Eldar's lecture provided insights as to how the US government might work to help Israel dismantle its settlements, and also suggested that the US transform the Road Map into a binding security council resolution that would require Israel to dismantle settlements that it established since 1967. Eldar also called for US troops to replace IDF troops in Judea and Samaria and Gaza, whose task would be to fight Arab terrorism and oversee the dismantling of Israel's settlements.

The fact that a foreign government funded political lobby funds a journalist in a major Israeli newspaper should raise an immediate question as to how that reporter can continue to write, research and investigate the issues of the day as an objective journalist. Hanoch Marmori, the editor of HaAretz, confronted with the tendentious funding sources of his most senior writer, wrote that he accepts Eldar's explanation of his connection with the foundation.

Meanwhile, the Israel Ministry of Interior Registrar of Non-Profit Organizations has opened an investigation into the Washington-based Foundation for Middle East Peace, which also registered itself as an Israeli foundation . As a result of its Israeli registration, the Foundation For Middle East Peace applied and received a grant in the year 2000-2001 from the European Union as an Israel-based peace organization that is qualified for an EU grant under the EU grants program to Israel-based peace organizations. The reason for the investigation is that the foundation has so far refused to provide the Israel Ministry of Interior Registrar of Non-Profit Organizations with the financial records that is required to provide by law.

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Background:
Will Egypt Expedite Arming Terrorists Via Terror Highway?
Dr Aaron Lerner
Director, IMRA

Date: 28 June 2003

It appears that Israel may have essentially agreed to an arrangement under which massive quantities of weapons can be moved from Egypt into the Gaza Strip without interference so long as the weapons are not yet used against Israel.

This represents a major victory for the Palestinian position, as stated repeatedly by PA security chief Dahlan and other Palestinian officials, that they will not act against the terror infrastructure ("cocked guns") but only against terrorist operations that are in violation of the "hudna" ("shooting guns"). [A "hudna" is a cease-fire period agreed to because the enemy is too strong. The idea is to amass enough power during the cease-fire period so that the enemy can be defeated when the cease-fire comes to an end.]

America's official position is that while the PA should act against the terror infrastructure that it is expected to act when the PA security forces are strong enough and organized to act with no clear date or deadline for action.

According to the reports of the Israeli-Palestinian understanding reached with the assistance of the United States, the PA will be expected to act against "ticking bombs" and Israel reserves the right to act if the PA fails to adequately address the threat of a "ticking bomb."

The Israeli justification for folding on the requirement that the PA act during the "hudna" period to collect weapons, etc., a requirement that enjoyed broad acceptance and understanding both in Israel and the United States, is that Israel considers the very fact that terrorist groups hold weapons to constitute a "ticking bomb".

This approach is problematic since typically "ticking bombs" refers to incidents excepted to take place within a relatively short period of time. As long as a particular group does not use a given weapons system, American observers interested in showing "progress" can be expected to argue, their possession of the weapons does not itself constitute a "ticking bomb."

Ironically, the greater the flow of weapons to the terrorists during the "hudna" period, the greater the incentive that they honor the cease-fire that enables them to continue arming.

The terms of the arrangement brokered by America are ideal for such a program: Israel is to halt all activity in the Palestinian Rafah area that might interfere with the operation of the smuggling tunnels used to transport weapons from Egypt to the Gaza Strip and will also allow Palestinian traffic to move undisturbed from Rafah to the remained of the Gaza Strip so that smuggled weapons can be easily distributed.

Egypt to date has, at best, ignored the existence of the smuggling operations from Egypt to the Gaza Strip. This policy has been costless to Egypt since Israeli governments have consistently declined to publicly criticize Egypt for this gross violation of Egypt's failure to honor its treaty obligations to prevent such operations.

It should be noted that Egypt receives considerable praise from the United States for its role in encouraging the various terror groups to agree to a "hudna". Egypt is also expected to continue playing a role to encourage these groups to comply with the "hudna".

As noted above, the greater the flow of weapons to the terrorists during the "hudna" period, the greater the incentive that they honor the cease-fire that enables them to continue arming. Thus if Egypt believes it will continue to enjoy immunity from criticism regarding the operation of the terror tunnels it has every reason to help in expanding and expediting the smuggling operations during the cease-fire period.

How long will this operation continue? Will the Arabs be able to bring in enough weapons to turn the Gaza Strip into a second South Lebanon with thousands of rockets, etc. threatening as far as Tel Aviv just as Hizbullah threatens Haifa?

Some Israelis believe that the various terror groups won't be able to hold themselves back and the arrangements will fall apart before a significant arming operation can be completed. This ignores that terrorist operations are more a problem of "spin" than anything else. As long as Dahlan himself isn't filmed murdering an Israeli live on CNN anything else is a question of interpretation: "rogue operations", "enemies of peace", "Abu Mazen hurt as much as Israel" and "Dahlan's forces are hot on the trail".

Can Egypt be put into a position that it acts against the terror tunnels?

There is no indication that the Government of Israel intends to break close to a decade of silence on this serious problem. But that does not prevent friends of Israel (and for that matter friends of peace) from using their influence in this matter. It should be noted that Egypt enjoys considerable assistance that is subject to congressional approval.

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World Jewish Congress Exposes UNRWA Refugee Camps as Bases for Terror

Calls for drastic reform of UNRWA
[IMRA: The publication is expected to will be available at WJC.org.il next week]

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has been co-opted by Palestinian terrorists, turning refugee camps into bases for the recruitment, training and dispatching of suicide bombers and other killers, according to the findings of a new study by the World Jewish Congress.

The study, UNRWA, Terror and the Refugee Conundrum: Perpetuating the Misery, by WJC Secretary General Dr. Avi Beker, documents how the UN agency has consistently perpetuated the refugee crisis and has become a roadblock to peace. Release of the report comes on the eve of an international conference to be held in London on Sunday June 29, on the "Forgotten Exodus of Jews from Arab Lands."

Conference speakers will document and explain the exchange of populations in the Middle East that began with the creation of the State of Israel. Approximately 900,000 Jews were expelled from Arab states in that period while some 600,000 Arabs left Israel. But while the Jews were fully absorbed into Israel and Jewish communities in the West, the Arabs were deliberately kept as refugees in UN camps throughout the region to exploit their plight for political purposes, regardless of the humanitarian impact. The London conference is the seventh in a series of WJC symposiums highlighting this issue.

UNRWA was created in 1949 to provide humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian Arab refugees. Since then, it has mushroomed into a bureaucratic behemoth employing over 20,000 people, with a budget of $311 million annually ­ about one-third of which comes from the United States.

"While there are certainly people of goodwill working for UNRWA, that cannot cover up the role that it plays in perpetuating the refugee crisis by thwarting plans for resettlement, and in enabling Palestinian terror against Israel to continue," Beker said. "As revealed during Israelšs Operation Defensive Shield in the spring of 2002, the camps have become bases for the recruitment, training and dispatching of suicide bombers and other terrorists."

The study charts the history of UNRWA's slide from an UN agency devoted to humanitarian aid, into one that collaborates with terrorist forces.

"The volatile mix of anti-Israel and antisemitic incitement that is prevalent in UNRWA camps, compounded with an insistence on a Palestinian "right of return" to Israel ensures the continuance of the conflict. A two-state solution in the Middle East, as envisioned by the roadmap and accepted by the parties, depends on an honest and comprehensive resolution to the refugee issue," said Dr. Beker. "As long as UNRWA and the Arabs continue to obstruct resettlement of Palestinians in Arab states, a two-state solution is impossible. Reform of UNRWA must be a first step to a just solution in the Middle East."

[6/26/03]

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Dennis Ross Declares Tanzim to be Peaceful And Trusts Abu Mazen Like He Trusted Arafat

Help Abbas succeed

By Dennis Ross
Originally published June 24, 2003

Washington - After a week of violence that followed the Aqaba summit, most Middle East observers are pessimistic about breaking the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate. Yet after a week of extensive discussions with both sides, I believe it's possible to create a period of calm. Among Palestinians, I found a profound desire to see the war with Israel end. The public wants to give their new prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas, a chance. More important, the activists of Yasser Arafat's Fatah, the Tanzim, who led the first intifada more than a decade ago and who have played an instrumental role in this one, believe that it's time for change. In meetings with several Tanzim leaders, I heard:

Force cannot work on Israelis or Palestinians.

A two-state solution - one Israel, one Palestine - is the only answer.

This moment must not be lost, not only because of the desire to resume peace talks but also because reform of the Palestinian Authority makes it necessary.

It's a mistake for Hamas to dominate the intifada.

There would not be support for a confrontation with Hamas, but the organization would not be permitted to block the current opportunity for peace. The views of Tanzim leaders are critical. In the West Bank, in particular, they dominate the grass roots in every city. Mr. Abbas and his security minister, Mohammed Dahlan, cannot take on Hamas without Tanzim support.

The Tanzim strongly supports a dialogue with Hamas to produce a cease-fire with Israel. Apart from needing the Tanzim to fulfill its security obligations, the new Palestinian government seeks a cease-fire because it needs time to rebuild its capabilities. And President Bush at Aqaba accepted Mr. Abbas' request for time.

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon might also have accepted Mr. Abbas' request for time if there had not been attacks on Israeli soldiers and settlers almost immediately after the Aqaba summit June 6. Mr. Sharon and the Israeli military were not prepared to refrain from military acts, including targeted killings, if it meant there would be attacks against Israelis and no Palestinian assumption of responsibility.

The recent violence was a grim reminder to both sides that the current opportunity easily could be lost. So direct talks between senior Palestinian and Israeli security officials resumed even before U.S. officials and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell arrived on the scene. Palestinian support for a cease-fire has not weakened, and Mr. Sharon has indicated Israel will accept it if Palestinian security forces assume responsibilities in at least part of Gaza and perhaps also in Bethlehem.

The Israeli acceptance of a cease-fire, however reluctantly, is revealing.

By definition, a cease-fire is a tactical move; it does not provide for dismantling the terrorist infrastructure as demanded by the Israelis and required by the "road map" to peace. But it reflects an understanding of reality. The Palestinian Authority needs time to rebuild its security structure and capabilities. It also needs a political context that the Palestinian public will accept when it's time to take apart the terror networks that Mr. Arafat permitted to flourish in the Palestinian territories.

Notwithstanding the desire for change on the Palestinian side, Mr. Abbas must show he can deliver. That will not prove to be easy, given several formidable obstacles.

First, he will face the continuing challenge of Hamas. Will it accept the cease-fire? And if so, for how long? In the aftermath of Israel's failed attack on Hamas senior official Abdel Aziz Rantisi, the Hamas position has hardened. It is not ruling out a cease-fire, but it is trying to bolster its position and tie Mr. Abbas' hands in terms of acting against it later.

Second, Mr. Arafat remains a serious impediment to change. While paying lip service to his "brother" Mr. Abbas, he seeks to subvert him by making competing appointments in the security apparatus, requiring the regional commanders to answer to him and not to Mr. Abbas or Mr. Dahlan and financing anti-Abbas leaflets. For Mr. Arafat, Mr. Abbas' success is his failure, proving that Mr. Arafat was the problem.

Third, the Israeli threshold of patience is very low. No senior Israeli official with whom I spoke questions Mr. Abbas' intentions. But they fear he will retreat when facing internal resistance and are convinced he will act only if he knows the Israelis will otherwise.

In such complicated circumstances, the United States will have to play a decisive role if the current moment is not to be lost. Mr. Abbas - and our Arab partners - must know unmistakably that granting time for developing capabilities does not mean not assuming responsibilities now. At a minimum, incitement must stop and whatever is agreed about obligations in Gaza or Bethlehem must be fulfilled.

Mr. Sharon must know that there should be no surprises; Israel has a duty to its citizens to go after "ticking bombs" if the Palestinians remain unable to do so. But there needs to be a clear understanding on what constitutes such a threat. And more than anything, there needs to be a precise choreographed set of steps that both sides will take (and not take) and on which they will be held to account.

The United States is not yet in the monitoring business. For that, there must be a clear standard of performance understood by both sides. That does not exist today, and Washington must create it.

If Mr. Abbas is to succeed, if the Tanzim are to remain committed to change and if the Israelis are to achieve their strategic objective of having a real peace partner, this is where the Bush administration must exert its efforts.

Dennis Ross, director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, was the special Middle East coordinator during the Clinton administrations from 1993 to 2001