Israel Resource Review 19th September, 2003


By-Laws of the European Parliament Award Special Treatment to South Africa and to . . . The Palestinian Authority

[Here are the by-laws in their entirety which apply to the European Parliament, adopted on June 2nd, 2003. Please scroll down to the bottom on the rules to discover that two entities have been awarded preferential treatment by the European Parliament: South Africa and . . . The Palestinian Authority- DB]

Rules applicable to the secondment of national officials to the european parliament and secondment of european parliament officials and temporary staff of political groups to national, international and regional bodies

3 June 2003

The Bureau of the European Parliament

Having regard to                 Rule 22 of the European Parliament's Rules of Procedure,

After                consulting the Joint Committee

After                the Staff Committee

Whereas                it is in the interest of the European Parliament to ensure greater collaboration and close working relationships between the Community civil service and that of the Member States and candidate States or international organisations and to develop exchanges of information and experience

Whereas                "secondment" of European Parliament staff within the meaning of these rules is intended to be covered by Article 35(a), not by Article 35(b) of the Staff Regulations

Chapter I: Scope of the Rules

Article 1 - Scope

These Rules shall apply to national officials (referred to below as "SNO"s) seconded to the Secretariat of the European Parliament and to the secretariat of political groups of the European Parliament, by an international, national or regional public authority and to European Parliament officials and temporary agents of political groups seconded to such international, national or regional authorities.

Chapter II: Rules Governing Secondment of National Officials to the European Parliament

Section A: General provisions of employment

Article 2 - Conditions of secondment

1. Except where the Secretary General of the European Parliament grants a derogation, a SNO must be a national of a Community Member State, of a state which has applied for accession, on condition that the accession process has been launched and has not been discontinued, or of a state or territory listed in Annexe A. Derogations shall not be required for SNOs from countries belonging to the European Economic Area (EEA) who are seconded under the terms of agreements signed with these countries and under the ad hoc conditions laid down. Account shall be taken of geographical and gender balance and equality of opportunity when admitting SNOs.

2. In order to be admitted as an SNO in the European Parliament the SNOs shall remain in paid employment in their administration of origin throughout the period of secondment. They shall not, during the twelve months preceding their secondment, have been party to any contract with the European Parliament, whether paid or otherwise. At the time of secondment the official shall have been employed by his or her current employer for at least one year.

3. Secondment shall be implemented by an exchange of letters between the Secretary General of the European Parliament or the Appointing Authority of the political group and the administration concerned or the Office of the Permanent Representative of the Member State concerned, or the international organisation, as the case may be. Correspondence shall be exchanged with the EFTA Secretariat for countries of the European Economic Area, and with the appropriate diplomatic missions for non-Member countries.

4. Persons employed in the private sector cannot be seconded to the European Parliament.

5. Prior to any secondment, the department to which the SNO is to be assigned shall state to the Secretary-General that there is no conflict of interest between the candidate SNO and the tasks to be entrusted to him or her. The SNO shall also be required to submit a declaration on his/her honour declaring that there is no risk of conflict of interests between the functions he performs for his employer or the professional activities of his close family and the tasks to be entrusted to him as a SNO.

6. Where the directorate-general to which a SNO is to be assigned considers that the nature of its activities requires particular security precautions, security clearance should be obtained before the recruitment of the SNO.

7. Both parties shall communicate to the competent department of the Directorate-General for Personnel any change which takes place during the secondment.

8. In the event of doubt, the department to which the official has been assigned shall consult the department of the Directorate-General for Personnel responsible for managing SNOs.

Article 3 - Basic conditions for professional experience and knowledge of languages in order to qualify for secondment

1. To qualify for secondment to the European Parliament a national official must have at least three years' full time experience of administrative, scientific, technical, advisory or supervisory duties in a grade equivalent to Categories A/LA or B as defined in the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities.

2. A SNO from a Member State must have a thorough knowledge of one official EU language, and a satisfactory knowledge of a second official EU language. A SNO from a non-Member country must have a thorough knowledge of at least one official EU language.

Article 4 - Period of secondment

1. The period of secondment may be not less than one month and not more than one year; it may be renewed successively up to a total period not exceeding three years. The secondment shall commence on either the first or the sixteenth day of the month.

2. The proposed period of secondment shall be fixed at the outset in the exchange of letters provided for in Article 2, paragraph 3. The same procedure shall apply in the case of a renewal of the period of secondment.

3. A national official who has already served on secondment may be permitted to serve on a new secondment, subject to the following conditions:

    a. the SNO has actually rejoined his or her original employer;

    b. the SNO continues to fulfil the conditions of eligibility for secondment.

    c. a period of at least three years must have elapsed between the end of the previous period of secondment and a new secondment; if at the end of the first secondment, the SNO remains within the European Parliament on the basis of a different, contractual arrangement, the three-year period shall begin to run from the expiry of that contract.

Article 5 - Place of secondment

1. The place of secondment may be either Brussels or Luxembourg.

2. The place of secondment shall be specified in the exchange of letters provided for in Article 2, paragraph 3.

Article 6 - Place of recruitment

1. For the purpose of these Rules, the place of recruitment shall be the place where the SNO performed his or her duties prior to secondment;

2. If, on recruitment a SNO is already on secondment on behalf of his or her employer in a place different from his or her usual place of work, the place of recruitment shall be either the last place of secondment or the usual place of work, whichever of the two is closer to the place of secondment as defined in Article 5(1)

3. The place of recruitment shall be specified in the exchange of letters provided for in Article 2, paragraph 3.

Section B: Duties, rights and obligations

Article 7 - Duties

1. SNOs shall assist European Parliament officials or temporary agents and carry out the duties assigned to them in the context of a predetermined job description.

2. SNOs shall take part in missions or meetings other than service meetings only:
    - if accompanying a European Parliament official or temporary agent, or
    - if alone, either as an observer or for information purposes. Under no circumstances may a SNO on his or her own represent the European Parliament with a view to entering into commitments (financial or otherwise) or negotiating on its behalf.

3. The European Parliament shall remain solely responsible for approving the results of any tasks performed by the SNO and for signing any official documents arising from them.

Article 8 - Rights and obligations

1. The provisions of Articles 11 to 22 of the Staff Regulations concerning the rights and obligations of officials shall apply by analogy.

2. SNOs shall be subject to the code of conduct applying to the Secretariat of the European Parliament.

Section C: Working conditions

Article 9 - Working hours

1. SNOs shall be bound by the rules on working hours in force in the European Parliament.

2. SNOs shall serve on a full time basis throughout the period of secondment. However, following a duly motivated request originating from the directorate-general to which the SNO is assigned or from the SNO and subject to compatibility with the interests of Parliament, the Head of the Personnel Division may authorise part-time working by a SNO after agreement by her or his employer. In this case, the amount of annual leave and daily allowances will be reduced in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 5, and Article 12, paragraph 3.

The request for part-time work must be signed by all hierarchical superiors of the SNO before being forwarded to the Personnel Division.

Article 10 - Interruptions in periods of secondment

1. The European Parliament may authorise interruptions in periods of secondment and specify the terms applicable. During such interruptions:

(a) the daily subsistence allowance referred to in Article 12 shall not be payable;

(b) the travel expenses referred to in Article 13 shall be payable only if the interruption is at Parliament's request.

2. A decision on an interruption in the period of secondment shall be taken by either the Secretary-General of the European Parliament or the SNO's employer after an exchange of letters as provided in Article 2, paragraph 3.

3. The secondment may be extended for a period equal to the period of interruption, with the agreement of all parties concerned.

Article 11 - Sick leave, annual leave, special leave, public holidays and maternity leave

1. The provisions of Articles 57 to 61 of the Staff Regulations, except Article 59, paragraph 1, 4th subparagraph, concerning leave and public holidays, shall apply by analogy.

2. However, the period of paid sick leave provided for in Article 59 of the Staff Regulations, shall not exceed one month or a period equivalent to that already worked by the SNO where the latter is longer. Such leave may not extend beyond the duration of the secondment of the person concerned.

At the end of the above periods the allowances referred to in Article 12, paragraph 1, shall be automatically suspended by a decision of the Head of the Personnel Division.

3. However, SNOs who are the victim of an occupational accident which occurs during the secondment shall continue to receive the allowance in full throughout the period during which they are unfit for work up to the end of the duration of the secondment.

4. Provisions in the Staff Regulations concerning days of leave which refer to travelling time, age and category are not applicable to SNOs.

5. For part-time work, annual leave is reduced accordingly.

6. Where the national legislation of the SNO's employer grants a longer period of maternity leave than the period provided for in the Staff Regulations, an interruption in the secondment shall be applied for the period exceeding that granted by the European Parliament. A period equivalent to the interruption shall be added to the end of the secondment if the interests of the European Parliament warrant it.

7. A SNO may, as an alternative, apply for an interruption in the secondment to cover the whole of the period taken for maternity leave. Such an interruption shall likewise be subject to the provisions of paragraph 6, second subparagraph, of this Article.

8. Management and control of leave, working time and absences shall be the responsibility of the directorate general or service to which the national official is assigned.

9. Days of annual leave not taken by the end of the secondment shall not be reimbursable.

Section D : Allowances and expenses

Article 12 - Subsistence allowances

1. SNOs shall be entitled, throughout the period of secondment, to a daily subsistence allowance, except where their employer determines otherwise. This allowance shall be paid monthly in arrears.

If the SNO's country of origin is a Community Member State or a country belonging to the European Economic Area the allowance payable shall be †50,-per calendar day. If the country of origin is a candidate state or one of the states or territories listed in Annexe A, the allowance shall be equal to two-thirds of the long-term mission allowance (as payable to European Parliament officials in grades not senior to A4) laid down for the place of secondment per calendar day.

2. No daily allowance shall be paid to the SNO
a) if the place of recruitment is the same as the place of secondment
b) if at the time of recruitment the SNO's spouse resides at the place of secondment
c) in any case where the secondment does not imply a change in the place of residence

3. For part-time work the daily allowance shall be reduced proportionately.

4. On taking up their duties, SNOs shall receive the equivalent of 30 days' subsistence allowance paid in advance. Once this payment has been made, there shall be no further entitlement to allowances for the corresponding period.

If a SNO definitively ends his or her secondment with the Parliament before expiry of the period taken into account for calculation of the advance payment, that portion of the payment made to the SNO corresponding to the period not spent on secondment shall be recoverable.

5. The amount of the subsistence allowance for SNOs shall be subject to periodic revision, carried out on the initiative of the Head of the Personnel Divison and subject to approval by the Secretary-General.

Article 13 - Travel expenses

1. SNOs from a candidate state or one of the states or territories listed in Annexe A may on a decision by the Head of the Personnel Division, receive reimbursement of their own travel expenses, if they are not already covered by their employer.
    - From the place of recruitment to the place of secondment at the beginning of the period of secondment;
    - From the place of secondment to the place of recruitment at the end of the period of secondment.

2. The amount reimbursed shall be based on the cost of the second class rail fare where the single journey does not exceed 500 km. Where the journey exceeds 500 km or the standard route involves a sea crossing, payment shall be based on the cost of a reduced price (PEX or APEX) air ticket. Tickets and boarding cards must be submitted. If the SNO has travelled by car he/she must submit a declaration on his/her honour.

Article 14 - Missions and mission expenses

If a SNO is sent on mission he/she shall be reimbursed mission expenses in accordance with the rules and conditions relating to the payment of mission expenses in force at the European Parliament. During his/her mission the SNO shall continue to receive the total amount of the daily allowances referred to in Article 12.

Section E: Training

Article 15 - Training

SNOs may be authorised by the director-general of the service to which they are assigned to attend training courses organised by the European Parliament if the interests of the Parliament warrant it.

In this case the department of the Directorate-General for Personnel responsible for managing SNOs shall be informed.

Section F: Social security

Article 16 - Social security

SNOs will remain subject throughout the period of secondment to the social security legislation applicable in their administration of origin. Prior to the secondment, the SNO's employer shall certify to the European Parliament that the SNO will be covered by the social security regime applicable to that civil service and that the employer will assume responsibility for expenses incurred abroad.

Section G: Termination of secondment

Article 17 - Termination of periods of secondment

1. Periods of secondment may be terminated before the foreseen date on the basis of a duly motivated request either from the Secretary-General of the European Parliament or from the SNO's employer. Periods of secondment may also be terminated before the foreseen date for any other sufficient cause at the SNO's request, subject to the prior agreement of his/her employer and the European Parliament.

2. Failure to comply with the provisions of Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Article 8 may cause the European Parliament to terminate the secondment.

3. A decision on termination of secondment before the foreseen date shall be taken by the Secretary-General of the European Parliament after an exchange of letters as provided in Article 2, paragraph 3, with one month notice. This period may be shorter if special circumstances justify it.

Chapter III:

Rules governing secondments of european parliament officials and temporary staff of political groups to national, international and regional bodies

Article 18

Officials of the European Parliament and temporary agents of political groups may, on a decision of the Secretary-General or of the Appointing Authority of the political group, be seconded to national or regional parliaments with legislative competence or to central or regional administrations of the Member States or of the candidate countries or to international organisations. This secondment shall take place with the agreement of the official or temporary agent concerned.

So far as possible, priority shall be accorded to secondments to parliamentary bodies.

Article 19 - Conditions of secondment

1. These Rules shall apply to European Parliament officials and temporary agents of the political groups in categories A/LA and B.

2. At the time of secondment
    - the official must have been employed for at least one year by the European Parliament and he/she must have been established as an official.
    - the temporary agent must have been employed for at least one year by the political group and his/her probationary period must have been completed.

3. Any decision concerning secondment in accordance with these rules must be taken in the interest of the service.

Article 20 - Administrative and financial position

1. Officials seconded in accordance with Article 18 above shall remain subject to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities. They shall retain their administrative assignment, rights to advancement and eligibility for promotion. The place of employment shall remain that on which the official carried out his or her duties on the day before the secondment commenced. During the secondment the official or temporary agent may be replaced only by a member of the auxiliary staff.

2. During the secondment, management and control of working time and absences shall be the responsibility of the host administration.

Any application for annual or special leave authorised by the host administration shall be transmitted to the competent service of the European Parliament or to the secretariat of the political group.

At the end of the secondment a list of the days of leave taken and of any other absence shall be submitted to the competent service of the European Parliament or to the secretariat of the political group.

3. At the end of the secondment an evaluation report of the seconded official or temporary agent shall be submitted by the host administration to the Secretary-General of the European Parliament or to the Appointing authority of the political group. This report will be taken into account during the establishment of the annual staff report relevant to the period of secondment.

4. The European Parliament shall continue to pay the secondee's salary, may grant a subsistence allowance equal to two-thirds of the long-term mission allowance laid down for the place of secondment and may reimburse travelling expenses incurred at the beginning and end of the secondment.

However the subsistence allowance shall not be granted
    - if the place of secondment is the same as the place of employment
    - if at the time of the secondment the spouse of the official or the temporary agent reside at the place of secondment
    - in any case where the secondment does not imply a change in the place of residence

5. The seconded official or temporary agent may not receive any salary, allowance or other financial compensation from the host administration without prior permission of the Secretary-General of the European Parliament or the Appointing Authority of the political group.

Article 21 - Period of secondment

1. The duration of secondments shall be subject to a maximum of twelve months, with no possibility of extension.

2. Interruptions in periods of secondments may be authorised on the basis of a duly motivated request either from the Secretary-General of the European Parliament or the Appointing Authority of the political group or of the host administration. During such interruptions the daily subsistence allowance, referred to in Article 20, paragraph 4, shall not be payable.

The secondment may be extended for a period equal to the period of interruption, with the agreement of all parties concerned. In that case the travel expenses as referred to in Article 20, paragraph 4, shall be payable by the Administration having asked for the interruption.

3. An official or temporary agent may not commence a further secondment within five years of the date of completion of a previous secondment.

Article 22 - Termination of secondment

1. Periods of secondment may be terminated before the foreseen date on the basis of a duly motivated request from any of the parties concerned.

2. A decision on termination of secondment before the foreseen date shall be taken by the Secretary-General of the European Parliament or the Appointing Authority of the political group with one month notice. This period may be shorter if special circomstances justify it.

3. At the end of his/her secondment the official or temporary agent shall at once be reinstated in the post formerly occupied by him/her.

Chapter IV: Final Provisions

Article 23

1. These Rules shall enter into force on 2 June 2003 and replace the Rules of 13 May 2002.

2. These Rules shall apply to all new and renewed secondments where the SNO or the official of the European Parliament or the temporary agent of the political group takes up duties on the date of entering into force or any date thereafter.

Annexe A: States and territories other than member-states, EEA countries and candidate countries to which the present rules are applicable

Palestinian Authority
Republic of South Africa

Adopted by the Bureau on 2 June 2003.

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Deconditioning Palestinian Arab Society From Inculcated Hatred
Dr. Daphne Burdman, M.D.

In the event of a peace declaration between the Palestinian Arabs and Israel, either as a result of a negotiated peace, or after a Ccpitulation by the Palestinians secondary to successful Israeli military action, the rabid hatred of Israel presently manifested by Palestinian society at large will have to be addressed, or it will obviate any possibility of a successful peace process. It is noted that a Capitulation by Israel is not envisaged, due to the declared intent of the Palestinian Arabs (both by the P.A. and by Hamas, Islamic Jihad etc.) to annihilate the State of Israel.

Although even more complex than the post WWII situation in view of the absence of an effective, neutral coalition similar to the Allied coalition after WWII, yet it is essential to start considering the format of Reconstruction within any future Palestinian Arab state or autonomous area which will be brought into existence.

The following parameters are posited as cornerstones of the reconstruction process:

- Criminalization of incitement to violence and preaching of martyrdom.

- Consideration of "Nuremberg-type" trials.

- Psychological deconditioning from hatred and violence.

- Democratization.

- Establishment of a body representing Moderate Islam to perform as Consultants and Administrators in conjunction with secular officials, both Palestinian Arabs and non-Palestinian.

- A massive "Marshall Plan" type program for socio-economic development of the ensuing Palestinian society.


In that Palestinian Arab society has been imbued with profound hatred by deliberate programming through all available means, including societal communication, formal education within the schools, extensive well-coordinated official Palestinian Authority media programs, and messages from the mosques inspired by political (militant) Islam, establishment of a future peace between the Palestinian Arabs and Israel, will require considerably more than "dismantling the terrorist organizations". Such dismantlement is an essential first step, which of necessity must be followed by a 2-pronged simultaneous program consisting of (1) deconditioning from hatred, (2) massive societal reconstruction.

1.Palestinian Arabs, but most particularly Palestinian Arab youth, have been conditioned to hatred of Israel, Israelis and (to a somewhat lesser extent) of the U.S by programs (described elsewhere) which employ highly sophisticated psychological methods and which thereby tap profound underlying psychological processes. It is therefore essential that psychological deconditioning, which uses similarly designed mechanisms, must be utilized to undo this profound conditioning to hatred, and must form an integral part of any reconstruction program. This will be a long and arduous process.

It will be established in the schools, and in the media. Educationists as well as psychologists will need to be closely involved in establishing and refining such programs.

2. Essential factors in Palestinian Arab societal reconstruction will include:

A. Active education about true democracy, development of a flourishing civil society, development of an active middle class with incorporation of entrepreneurial aspects, equality of women, a legal constitution which reflects contemporary aspects of democratic jurisprudence, the rule of law, due process, and human rights, and which recognizes freedom of religion and separation of "Church" and State. In accord with concerns about "one man, one vote, one time", some authorities indicate that implementation of elections per se must needs be delayed until the democratization process is well advanced and has been seen to be successfully employed by community groups etc. at a local level.

B. Constantly ongoing active inputs, both consultative and administrative, from prominent and respected Islamic Moderates, both secular and religious, will be indispensable and essential at all phases of education and democratization.

C. Massive repair and development of the Palestinian Arab nation by a contemporary "Marshall Plan" will be essential, running concurrently with above programs

In order to permit development of the above processes, and drawing on the successful experiences of the post World War II programs, all forms of incitement to, teaching of, and, preaching of, violence for political ends, must be criminalized in Palestinian Arab society. Trial by due process and strict enforcement of legal sentences will need to be implemented. The holding of Nuremberg-type trials will need to be strongly considered for designated war criminals. This will involve intense legal and political discussion.

It is to be remembered that:

Strict monitoring will be essential at all stages in view of the unfortunate history of

(i) consistent non-compliance by the Palestinian Authority.

(ii) monitoring agencies who have failed to monitor for various reasons including holding the autonomy of developing nations as a sacrosanct principle, or who have abused their prerogative. Such agencies include the E.U., the U.N. and UNWRA.

Current international attitudes present a considerable problem in terms of the commonly accepted interpretations of "just wars" and deprivation theory as the basis for hatred and terrorism. Recognition of issues raised above will be necessary in terms of gaining international allegiance.

It is highly likely that sophisticated psychologists and psychiatrists have been responsible for formulating the existing programs within the P.A. of indoctrination to hatred, violence, martyrdom, and "suicide bombings"

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The "Right of Return" The Wild Card of the Middle East Negotiation Process
An Israel Resource News Agency Backgrounder

The 1948 War Continues

Israel's 1948 war has not been resolved. The Palestinian Authority and PLO, with the help of the UN, keep that war simmering. How? With the demand to implement the "Right Of Return", so that Arab refugees and their descendents may claim Arab homes and villages abandoned during the 1948 war, even if they have been replaced by Israeli cities, collective farms and woodlands

While anywhere between 450,00 and 700,000 Arabs left or fled from the former British mandate of Palestine during Israel's 1948-49 war of independence, the PLO now claims that eight million Arabs must be allowed to return to live within Israel's 1949-1967 cease-fire at the end of any peace settlement.

The demand for " The Right of Return" gets little media coverage in the mainstream media in the west and even in Israel.

Most people, even Israelis, know nothing about it.

Yet all foreign governments involved in middle east negotiations, including the US, give tacit support to the "right of return", which is a simple formula to replace Israel's population with an Arab population who claim more than 80% of Israeli homes as the property of Palestinian Arab refugees and their descendents.

"Right of Return" in the UN-run Palestinian Arab refugee camps

Schools in the UN-run Palestinian Arab refugee camps inculcate a new generation that soon they will be living inside a Jew's house inside Israel.

Take a look at the precision with which the "right of return" curriculum is taught at, where the descendents of Palestinian Arab refugees can peruse photos and maps of the homes and villages that they expect to return to . . . which are now "occupied" by Jews.

You can see how the "right of return" is woven into the official curriculum of the Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Education at, whose schools and school books are funded by the US AID, Canada and all major European nations.

"Right of Return": Basis of the 'Road Map'

The issue of the Palestinian Arab demand for "right of return" to the Arab villages that they left in 1948 is now on the table.

Indeed, the current "road map", sponsored by the US, the EU, Russia and the UN is based on the "Saudi peace plan" proposed by Crown Prince Abdullah on March 28th 2002 at the Arab League in Beirut. Nabil Shaath, the Palestine Authority Foreign Minister and Arafat confidante, affirmed in Beirut on August 16th that the US-sponsored road map would mandate the right of Palestinian Arab refugees to return to their homes and villages from 1948.

Surprisingly, Shaath was correct. All you have to do is to read the official document of "road map" to know that The Saudi initiative, which supports the "right of return", provides the basis for the Road Map, can be found in the document entitled " A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict"

In other words, the "Saudi peace plan" demands that Israel must accept the recognition of the "right of return" for any Palestinian Arab refugee or any refugee descendant who would want to act upon his or her "right".

All this is in keeping with the Palestinian State Constitution, authored by the same Nabil Shaath and ratified on March 26th by the US- funded PLC, the Palestine Legislative Council. That constitution legislates the "right of return" for all Palestinian Arab refugees and their descendents to return to the villages from 1948, even if they no longer exist

Thousands of maps recently issued and distributed by the Palestinian National Authority in Arabic and in English provide a clear guide for Palestinian Arab refugees and their descendants to forcibly take back the 531 Arab villages lost in 1948 which have been replaced by Israeli cities, collective farms and woodlands.

None of the villages where Palestinian Arab refugees demand the "right of return" are located in Judea, Samaria (Also known as the west bank) or Gaza.

Only last week, Palestinian Arabs fired kassam rockets into Ashkelon from UN refugee camps in Gaza, followed by The Palestinian Authority's PBC Voice of Palestine news anchor's excited announcement, some 24 hours after the Arab rocket attack, that "Palestinian fighters," he said, "had attacked the Israeli settlement in Majdal- Ashkelon."

The emphasis in his voice was on Majdal, alluding to the fact (which his Arab Palestinian listeners would be expected to know) that Ashkelon has been built on the ruins of al-Majdal, a cluster of Arab villages.

The refugee residents of UNRWA camps in Gaza speak of the necessity of removing "illegal Israeli settlements" to achieve peace.

One might think that they are referring to the 21 Israeli Jewish farming communities that have been founded on the sand dunes south of Gaza in the context of their claim to all of Gaza

However, an example of a settlement that the UNRWA camp residents wish to remove is the "illegal Israeli settlement" of Ashkelon, which replaced Majdal and other Arab villages as a result of the 1948 war, or the constantly shelled Shderot, which replaced Arab villages in the Negev.

The "Right of Return": Motto of the Palestinian Authority

The emergence of a Palestinian Arab entity in the form of the Palestinian Authority has done little to stem Palestinian Arab expectations for the "right of return"…

After the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations during summer 2000, both the Israeli and Palestinian Arab delegations to the talks confirmed that the talks broke down because Israel did not recognize the "right of return"

As Israeli negotiator Dan Meridor told me in an interview in September, 2000, the Israeli delegation was amazed that the Palestinian Arab delegation was so adamant on the full recognition of the "right of return".

Yet Palestinian Legislative Council Chairman, Ahmad Qurei', [a.k.a. "Abu 'Alaa"], Arafat's most recent candidate for prime minister of a future Palestinian Arab state, has declared time and again that the ideology of a Palestinian Arab state must be based on the "right of return". As he stated in 1999: : " . . . Either [we achieve] a just peace that will guaranty the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including [the] Return, self determination, and the establishment of an independent [Palestinian] state with Jerusalem as its capital - or there will be no peace but [rather] a return to the struggle in all its forms."

Al-Ayyam, September 24 1999
[Excerpt from MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 58 November 18, 1999]

We asked the head of the PLO refugee committee, Daoud Baraket, about the difficulties of that "right of return", since Israelis live in cities which replaced the Arab villages from 1948. Baraket had a simple solution. "The Israelis should leave", he said. And what if they do not leave, we asked. "Well, we would have to kill them, and international law would be on our side", Baraket said.

"Right of Return": The Basis of UNRWA

The "Right Of Return" also forms the basis for the UN operation of UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, established back in 1950 to administer 59 "temporary" Palestinian Arab refugee camps for the past 55 years instead of repatriating them to Arab countries.

UNRWA continues to operate these camps as "temporary shelters" under that very mandate of the "right of return"

Often, UNRWA Arab refugee camps organize each neighborhood according to the precise neighborhoods and villages from where they left in 1948, so as to facilitate their repatriation to those same neighborhoods and

In June of this year, Hamas won 60% of the votes to take over the UNRWA workers union, the professional guild which represents the 23,000 employees of UNRWA, most of whom are college-educated Palestinian Arab residents of the UNRWA camps.

That indicates the ideology which dominates of the UNRWA employees people who run the camps.

It is no wonder that the 59 UNRWA refugee camps remain the safe haven of Arab terror groups.

The Lebanese Equation:

Lebanon is the one country where UN camps are most likely to prime Palestinian Arab refugees to "return to their homes from 1948" 320,000 Palestinian Arab refugees wallow in the UNRWA camps in Lebanon, which is the only host country for UNRWA which restricts Palestinian Arabs from working in most professions, so as to keep the Palestinian Arabs impoverished and dependent n the UNRWA camps.

UNRWA camps in Lebanon openly conduct daily military exercises to prepare thousands of refugees for the day that will come when they flood northern Israel to retake their homes and villages that were lost in the 1948 war, all under the spirit and slogan of the "right of return".

Surprising US acquiescence to the "Right of Return"

People across the political spectrum in Israel expected that the Bush Administration to stand with Israel on the issue of the "right of return", since the idea of Palestinian Arabs flooding Israel with refugees seemed incompatible with the Bush notion of a two-state solution where Arab refugees would be absorbed by a Palestinian Arab entity.

However, two days before the road map was affirmed with strong reservations by the Israeli cabinet, Shimon Schiffer, the senior diplomatic correspondent for the Yediot Aharonot newspaper, reported on May 23, 2003 that "the Americans rejected one of Israel' central demands, which states that the Palestinian Arabs would agree to concede the right of return in return for Israel's recognition of a Palestinian Arab state".

The US also rejected Israel's request to remove the Saudi proposal (a full withdrawal to the lines of June 4, 1967, recognition of the right of return, in return for the recognition of Israel by the Arab countries and natural relations) as the basis of the road map's authority.

The US support for the "right of return" is no theoretical matter.

That support was translated into the $114 million that the US contributed over the past fiscal year to UNRWA - 30% of the UNRWA budget.

On August 4th, the US allocated another $26 million to UNRWA, with no strings attached to mandate that UNRWA should not promote the "right of return"

Will the US Congress Place Constraints on UNRWA?

Rep. Chris Smith (R;NJ), deputy chairman of the US House International Relations Committee, successfully offered an amendment on August 18th expressing the "Sense of the Congress" that "UNRWA was failing to vigorously oppose terrorism, and calling on the Department of State and UNRWA's own leadership to "take more pro-active steps to disassociate UNRWA from the terrorist elements that operate within and among its staff and humanitarian operations". Smith's amendment demands that UNRWA comply with section 301(c) of the US Foreign Assistance Act which curtails US aid to any humanitarian agency which hosts military training.

It will soon be up to the US Congress to determine if they agree with the assessment of the Dr. Reuven Ehrlich, the head of Israel's "Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center" who wrote a position paper in December, 2002 for Israeli intelligence which concluded that "Terrorist Organizations use UNRWA officials and Facilities to Carry out Terrorist Activities" {See text on Israel Resource Review of March 31, 2003)

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Arafat's "Kleptocracy" Revisted
George M. Stanislavski

[This manuscript was originally prepared a year ago and is still relevant today, as Arafat tightens his grip on the control of the PA - DB]

Imagine former Enron CEO Kenneth Lay, who plundered his company's assets before its demise, pleading poverty and then asking world leaders and financial institutions to help support the jobless employees and destitute pensioners of Enron. Imagine Lay actually receiving money from donors around the world and then skimming a sizable percentage himself and a handful of his cronies.

Would tax payers in donor countries remain silent if they knew their governments continuously dished out at least $4.7 billion (and possibly as much as $8 billion depending on the accounting method) to a group that offered no financial transparency? Do these scenarios sound incredible? Not if you substitute the names Yasser Arafat for Kenneth Lay and Palestinian Authority for the Enron executives. Unfortunately this is fact and not fiction and the joke is on American, European and Israeli tax payers who have been footing the bill since 1993 when Arafat and his thugs took control of the PA. With a combination of cunning con and excellent PR, Arafat has turned the plight of hundreds of thousands of ordinary Palestinians living in squalid refugee camps into a multi-billion dollar empire for himself and a handful of his PA cohorts. The more donor countries and organizations give contributions earmarked as aid to the indigent Palestinian populace, the richer Arafat and his cronies get. Though there have been dozens of articles for nearly a decade exposing Arafat's mega-billion-buck scam, the officials in charge of spending the taxpayers' money, have ignored these allegations and kept sending the checks to the PA. As early as December 2, 1992 the WALL ST.JOURNAL EUROPE published an article entitled "Don't Underrate Arafats Bank Account" by Rachel Ehrenfeld. She later went on to coin the PA regime as a "Kleptocracy".

Today, Dr. Ehrenfeld is the Director of the New York based Center for the Study of Corruption & the Rule of Law (CII). The center conducts comprehensive evaluation of corruption practices for the development of an International Integrity Standard with the help of a team of anti-corruption specialists who codify, measure and explore the most prevalent forms of corruption in the public and private sectors, nationally and internationally. Yasser Arafat 's "Kleptocracy" has been studied by the center since the Oslo agreement.

According to Ehrenfeld, the PLO, the precursor of today's PA, had eight principal sources of income which produced an annual income of at least $1.5 billion:

1. Official contributions from Arab states;

2. The Palestinian Liberation Tax Fund - a 3.5-to-7% tax on Palestinian workers in Arab states;

3. Income from investments;

4. Donations from wealthy Palestinians and various philanthropic organizations;

5. Extortion ("protection" charges for companies or states from terrorist operations);

6. Illegal arms deals;

7. Drug trafficking;

8. Fraud and other criminal activities.


Shortly before the Oslo agreement, Britain's National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) published an estimate of the PLO's loot in a 1993 briefing paper on organizations threatening the UK, calling it "the richest of all terrorist organizations." The NCIS estimated the PLO's ill-gotten gains at $8-10 billion. This report was preceded by a CIA report from 1990 estimating that the PLO had between $8-14 billion.

With the signing of the Oslo accords, the PLO terrorist group was given legitimacy instantaneously under the new name Palestinian Authority. Arafat and the heads of the PLO became the "legitimate" leaders of the PA and were recognized as representatives of the Palestinian people by every sovereign state including the Rabin-Peres government of Israel. The Israeli leaders were under the assumption that the PLO would be disbanded and its billions would be transferred to the PA treasury to be invested in public infrastructure. Instead the money stayed in PLO coffers controlled by Arafat and a handful of his confidants. Furthermore, immediately after Oslo, Arafat pleaded PA poverty and set out, kafeya in hand, on a world aid tour, claiming that the peace process would collapse without financial support from the international community.

Exactly how much money Arafat and the PA have pocketed is difficult to ascertain. According to Richard Chesnoff who quotes Ehrenfeld in a New York Daily News article, The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted an investigation of Arafat and the PA's wealth as early as November 1995. But the findings were kept secret because the Clinton administration, eager not to rock the peace process boat, insisted (via the CIA) that the publicity would hurt the "national security interest."

A 1996 report by the PA comptroller revealed that out of an annual budget of $800 million (coming mostly from foreign aid), 40% or $326 million had literally disappeared from PA coffers through corruption and mismanagement. The comptroller concluded:

"The overall picture is one of a Mafia-style government, where the main point of being in public office is to get rich quick." Arafat suppressed the report but promised reform.

Other disclosures

Dr. Ehrenfeld says she has documents supporting all her allegations against Arafat's misdeeds Though her center's findings on PA corruption are probably the most authoritative and go into the greatest detail, they are certainly not the only source of evidence on how the Palestinian Authority pockets money earmarked for humanitarian aid.

On July 12, 2002, Sari Nusseiba, the PA Minister for Jerusalem Affairs and President of Al Khuds University, openly admitted in an interview on the website Proche-Orient, that "PA officials are Guilty of Corruption and Bribery". When asked about Arafat's personal involvement in the corruption, Nusseiba carefully answered; He [Arafat] is not known as a corrupt individual, but, "I could be wrong …He does not use the money to buy houses and estates."

Arafat is too clever to buy ostentatious villas in PA controlled areas for his own personal use while ordinary Palestinians live in squalor. Instead he sends the money abroad: On June 5, 2002, the Kuwaiti daily Al-Watan published documents it received from a Cairo branch of an Arab bank showing that Arafat had deposited $5.1 million into his personal account - to support his wife and daughter, who live in Paris and Switzerland. According to the same report, the money came from Arab aid funds that had been allocated for the Palestinian people.

Al-Watan also reports that Muhammed Rashid , one of Arafat's top 'and most influential' advisors, received instructions from the "President" to buy 14% of the shares of the Jordanian Cement Company with funds received by Arafat from the Arab Gulf states. Apparently as Israeli forces destroy more Palestinian homes and buildings in retaliation to terrorist homicide bombings, the price of cement goes up in light of increased demand due to the needed reconstruction of these houses. As the western countries pay for the reconstruction, Arafat's shares in his cement business sky rocket. Nevertheless, many Hebron residents complained that funds earmarked for the Committee for the Reconstruction of Hebron Homes, never reached the people entitled to them. Rather, they were distributed to the PA leaders close to Arafat and to several top officials of the Fatah movement, headed by Arafat.

According to Jacky Hogi in an article for the Hebrew daily Ma'ariv, this same "economic advisor" Rashid controls major PA gasoline interests, a flour mill in Gaza, and partial ownership in the now closed Jericho casino.

However Rashid's biggest source of income is a company called "Behar" which is really a front for the largest "protection" racket in the PA controlled areas. Businesses large and small pay protection money to Behar, to smooth the way to get licenses from the PA, avoid workers' disputes other accidents and hazards that could befall a business and its owners. Hogi lists examples:

  • In Hebron, the police (whose salaries are paid by Rashid's patron, Arafat collect a "protection" tax of $50 a month from grocers in the shuk.

  • In Tulkarm, a businessman paid $100,000 to one of the intelligence services after his brother was arrested on suspicion of cooperation with Israel. After the payment, the brother was still not freed.

  • A gas station owner in Jericho reports that security personnel fill up at his station and never pay.

In a 1997 paper, Ehrenfeld claimed that Rashid also controlled over 65% of the charitable organizations in the PA, including the biggest in Gaza. Thus for every dollar given to a Palestinian charitable organization, Rashid and his boss Arafat get a cut. Ehrenfeld's paper concurs will the poignantly vivid account by Charles Radin which appeared in the Boston Globe on July 8, 2002:

Abu Daya and many others interviewed on a recent general food distribution day were upset by what they saw as corruption in the UN agency that parallels the corruption of the Palestinian Authority.

"My neighbor has a Mercedes, his sons have jobs, and he receives rations from UNRWA as a hardship case," Abu Daya said. "He has bought land, he has built a house, and he still is listed as a hardship case," entitling him to free supplies of flour, rice, and other foodstuffs over and above what ordinary refugees receive.

Inside food distribution compounds, outside their gates, and at nearby stores, the coupons Palestinians use to claim emergency food aid made available through the UN agency by international donors are bought and sold. The food itself, in packages clearly marked "not for resale," is openly resold.

Faez Abu Amri, a temporary food-distribution worker for the UN agency, says that "90 percent of the people who are getting this food aid do not need it," while the truly needy get less than they should have.

"I see people with boats, stores, and jobs" who get the food and resell it, or sell their food coupons, he said.

The PA "police" and civil servants who number approximately 121,000 (out of a population of 3 million) get their salaries from foreign donors are not exempt from paying tribute to their don. The money arrives in either dollars or euros but Arafat's servants are paid in Israel shekels after a 25% deduction in the exchange rate and a 3.7% surcharge. Where does the money go?

Mary Curtius of the Los Angeles Times reveals that Ahmed Qurei, better known as Abu Alaa, the Arafat's hand-picked prime minister of the PA, built a $2 million, 12 room villa cum swimming pool, lush landscaping, privacy wall and guard tower in Jericho.

Recent food riots probably made Qurei nervous. In May, he suddenly abandoned his house. The plaque tacked onto the perimeter wall says that Queri had dedicated it to the "Samed Institute, Workshops of the Children of the Martyrs." Other top PA officials such as Planning minister Nabil Sha'ath and former Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, and Arafat's security advisor Mohammed Dakhlan are also resented by the Palestinian populace for their lavish life style at the expense of the people.

Israeli soldiers manning road blocks have told this writer that Palestinians while undergo searches often complain openly; "Why are you searching me, you are the ones responsible for bringing Arafat back". Other soldiers have heard Palestinians vow: "after we finish this intifada with you Jews, we will make an intifada against [Hanan]Ashrawi, [Saib]Erikat, and [Nabil] Sha'ath!

Curtius quotes Ziad abu Amr, a Palestinian legislator and academic who said we are fed up with seeing "an official whose salary is $1000 a month who buys property worth millions. There was a lot of stealing, extortion, and bribery. We had a group of people who became wealthy by illegitimate means."

The LA Times article also relates the story of PA auditor genaral, Jarar Kidwa, a cousin to Arafat. In May of 1997, Kidwa issued a report on PA corruption. It detailed misuse of funds by the PA departments and caused such an uproar that Arafat never allowed Kidwa to publish another report. Kidwa claims that Arafat said "I am not allowed to make my report public, [because] our enemies can use it against us". Kidwa acknowledged that he has never been allowed to audit the budgets of the security services or Arafat's office. Nowadays only one other man sees his report--his cousin Yasser.

Intelligence experts are convinced that on going demonstrations by disgruntled Palestinians frustrated with the rampant corruption in the PA regime convinced Arafat years ago his rule was becoming shaky. The experts feel that the present war with Israel was launched by Arafat, in large measure, to deflect internal protest to an outside common enemy.

The $50 Billion "Paupers"

How much is the PLO net worth today? About a year ago, London Daily Telegraph and other papers revealed that computer hackers had broken the security code of the PLO's computer system, uncovering records of about $8 billion the PLO held in numbered bank accounts in New York, Geneva, and Zurich, and smaller secret accounts in North Africa, Europe, and Asia. The newspaper also unearthed further secret holdings of the PLO - including front companies, shares on many stock exchanges, European real estate, and considerable holdings in Mercedes-Benz, the national airlines of the Maldives , Guinea-Bissau and Nicaragua as well as duty-free stores at the Jomo Kenyatta Airport in Nairobi and Murtala Mohammad International Airport in Lagos, Nigeria. According to a 1991 report from the Task Force for Unconventional Warfare, US House of Representatives' Republican Resource Committee these holdings gave the PLO a base for forged travel documents and airline tickets. Dr. Ehrenfeld estimates that in the year 2000 PLO assets totaled about $50 billion (up from $32 billion recorded in 1998). Naturally, Arafat and his men denied these figures.

In March of 2003, the Jerusalem Post reported that Forbes magazine now listed Arafat as one of the world's wealthiest people with a personal fortune estimated at $300 million stashed away in secret Swiss accounts, Arafat is among those featured in the magazine's annual listing of the well-to-do. In a new category introduced this year entitled "Kings, Queens, and Despots," Forbes places Arafat in a respectable sixth place, right after Queen Elizabeth II of England, but ahead of Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands. Who ever said that terrorism doesn't pay?

While acknowledging that it is "a tricky business" to assess exactly how much Arafat and others on this select list might truly be worth, Forbes wryly notes that they deserve their own separate ranking because, "They don't exactly represent success stories of entrepreneurial capitalism." In Arafat's case, that is putting it mildly. For a man who used to boast about being married to the Palestinian revolution, he has done more than his fair share of plundering his own people, treating their public resources as his personal ATM machine to be looted at will. Otherwise how is it possible that someone whose official salary is several thousand dollars a month can amass a personal fortune of $300 million at least. Even if you take into account the $1 million in Nobel Prize money, it is impossible to accumulate such a large fortune in so little time honestly.

By and large western donors are guilty of a serious cover-up, despite the documentation and allegations of appalling PLO criminality. The sums involved from illegal activities are clearly vast. Yet, the international media, organizations, and donor governments all seem to have been struck by "willful blindness". Why? Before the present intifada there were those who felt that an internal house cleaning of Arafat's regime would lead to a breakdown of the "peace talks". After three years of war, this argument is now without any foundation, but the same proponents of this view still say no to removing Arafat. They claim that if the Arafat regime is removed, it will be replaced by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or some Islamic fundamentalist entity that would destabilize the entire region and possibly the world. They still feel that Arafat is the lesser of the evils and he will be content as long as he continues to get paid. They are in denial that the Palestinian street is a tinder box on the verge of explosion. When the spark is finally ignited, the Palestinian scene will be reminiscent of the French reign of terror and the Bolschevik Revolution.

The American administration is aware of this possible scenario and has called for reform of the entire PA apparatus. Arafat felt the US pressure and made anemic attempts to show compliance by "relinquishing" power to two hand-picked cronies Mahmoud Abas and Abu Alla . Both failed miserably as prime minister not only because they were undermined by Arafat but also because they have achieved great wealth at the expense of the Palestinian People.

Recently King Abdullah of Jordan requested that President Bush give Arafat another chance in trying to save the "road map" and the President responded by saying Arafat is incapable of fighting terror. Mr. Bush's statement is only a half-truth because Arafat and the entire Palestinian Authority are incapable of reform because they are too busy robbing their own people. Mr. Bush, the US State Department and even the Israel Government are aware of this graft and corruption but choose not to expose it. Meanwhile, donor nations are still paying, their tax payers are oblivious to where their tax money is going and Arafat and his PA Gang are laughing all the way to the bank. The only ones who remain suffering are hundreds of thousands of Palestinian people.

The writer is a Jerusalem based consultant and researcher. He is founder of the consulting firm Creative Business Solutions.

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US Intervenes to Protect Arafat's HQ From IDF Capture
David Bedein

As the debate ensues between the US and Israel as to whether or not Israel will capture, exile or kill Yassir Arafat, the Candian-based "Middle East Newsline" reported this week that the U.S. directly intervened to prevent the Israel Defence Forces from capturing and neutralizing the Muqata'a, the headquarters of Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat.

"Middle East News Line" reported that the US State Department sent a strong directive to Israel to suspend plans to capture Arafat's headquarters in Ramallah over the weekend, even though Israel provided hundreds of captured documents to the US which prove that the Muqata' where the terror campaign against Israel is being planned and directed. .

Despite that, US Secretary of State Colin Powell and US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice telephoned Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to suspend military plans against the Mukatta.

An Israeli military force had captured a PA ministry about 300 meters from Arafat's headquarters and established a command post for the capture of the Muqata'a.

The significance of such a planned tactical move on the part of the IDF is that the Muqata'a,is precisely where the terror campaign of premeditated murder has been coordinated for exactly three years.

It is at the Muqata'a where Arafat for the past three years has coordinated of the Hamas, Islamic Jihad and all the PLO Armed groups under one command resulting in more than 20,000 Arab terror attacks which have been conducted from the Muqata'a over the past three years, resulting in the cold blooded murder of almost 900 men, women and children throughout Israel

A rubric of US foreign policy is that all of the Palestinian Arab security agencies need to work under one command.

Arafat's coordination of all security services at the Muqata'a. fulfilled that US policy directive regardless of the consequences for Israel.

The US has invested more than $100 million in the PA security agencies this year, under the premise that these funds would be allocated to forces loyal to former PA Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas and Security Affairs Minister Mohammed Dahlan, neither of whom are any longer in power… so the funds have been diverted to forces loyal to Yassir Arafat.

That leaves U.S. funds and U.S. security personnel in a position of training and advising the PLO armed forces who now coordinate terror attacks throughout Israel.

The question remains: Is it too late to avoid an inevitable scenario where an American "advisor" in the service of the PLO "security services" will be killed in a preemptive IDF attack on PLO forces.

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